"Dost not thou fear God, seeing thou art in the same condemnation? And we indeed justly; for we receive the due reward of our deeds: but this man hath done nothing amiss."

I don't know all the details of the Catholic teaching on the death penalty, except that apparently retribution is not an appropriate validation for it. Is the idea that only God can meet out such retribution? But the above quote indicates that they are receiving just punishment. And there's plenty of other cases in the Bible with this argument, isn't there?

Mike,

Actually, my understanding is that the proscription against retribution as an end in itself is a more fundamental holding of the Catholic Church than just for dealing with criminals. In the case of capital punishment, the Catechism frames punishment from essentially two perspectives: that of the public and that of the criminal.

From the former perspective, the goal is to keep the criminal from inflicting harm, and the question is whether that can be accomplished without killing him. In the time of Jesus, that would have been less of a possibility, and I would note that I've seen various translations for what the two crucified men were convicted of; if they were violent revolutionaries, for example, then they were arguably too dangerous to keep alive.

From the latter perspective, the objective is repentance and atonement. Criminals who accept their due punishment are taking it as a form of expiation. (That appears to be the point that Krikorian is emphasizing, although I don't believe that he's specifically Roman Catholic, as I am.) Since suicide is forbidden, however, it's a stretch, I'd say, to suggest that a criminal can accept death as the appropriate punishment to expiate a wrongdoing.

As for the specific quotation, I'd suggest that its usage, here, indicates a problem that people often have in interpreting the Bible: loss of context. Those words are spoken by a criminal being put to death, and they aren't explicitly affirmed as true by Jesus. Christ merely promises the second criminal that he "will be with me in Paradise," which I'd suggest has more to do with the criminal's affirmation of Jesus' identity: "Jesus, remember me when you come into your kingdom."

I often wonder if a major historical point of the death penalty was to ensure that later events don't free the killer. We don't often think seriously of political instability in this Age of Democracy. But it isn't gone. Prisoners still escape, occasionally. And even though governments don't rise and fall as quickly as they once did, political views still change quickly.

If Julius and Ethel Rosenberg hadn't been executed, does anyone doubt that a liberal president would have eventually pardoned them?

Yes, I doubt it. I don't think we've had a president liberal enough to forgive supplying nuclear information to the Soviet Union. Kennedy and Johnson fought communism in Cuba and Vietnam. Spies who had worked for the Soviets were prosecuted under Clinton. Jimmy Carter is probably the most liberal post-war president, but freeing the Rosenburgs us still a stretch.

It seems you are applying a characature to anyone who is not a conservative, and making an assumtion that cannot be disproved.

As for the topic at hand, I beleive someone can be remorseful without believing that the death penalty is appropriate. One can be remorseful and think that a life sentence, or 30 years, or parole to work with gang members to prevent future murders is approprate.

I believe, but I'm not certain, that Krikorian is Orthodox.

Ben Bateman: I often wonder if a major historical point of the death penalty was to ensure that later events don't free the killer... If Julius and Ethel Rosenberg hadn't been executed, does anyone doubt that a liberal president would have eventually pardoned them?

The Rosenbergs, though they committed a very serious crime, did not kill anyone. The Soviet nuclear weapons that they helped to build were, thankfully, never put to use. Was the death penalty really justified for them?

As far as their escaping and repeating their crime, that couldn't happen, since once the Rosenbergs were exposed, nobody would ever trust them with national secrets again.

Dancar: "It seems you are applying a characature to anyone who is not a conservative, and making an assumtion that cannot be disproved."

To whom did I apply a caricature, and what non-disprovable assumption did I make?

I posed a hypothetical situation. I think that they would have been pardoned, or at least freed. I asked if any DITL reader would doubt that. You answered the question: at least one would. How does that justify your response?

I was thinking of Kathy Boudin, an unrepentant member of the Weather Underground who killed a security guard in a robbery in 1981. She had been sentenced to life in prison, but became eligible for parole in 2001. In August 2003 she drew a parole board that sympathized with her radical cause, and released her. She is now a celebrity on the far Left.

The Rosenbergs have been martyrs of the Left for decades. If they had been left alive, a small but determined group of radicals would have worked endlessly to free them. It might not have been so public as a formal pardon from the executive. It could have been a subtle change in the rules for who gets parole, followed by a behind-the-scenes stacking of a parole board. But the Rosenbergs would have gone free eventually.

The reason for mentioning the Rosenbergs was to point out one of the death penalty's oft-neglected features: It is final, and was especially so in the days before liberal judges snarled the process with endless appeals, even as liberal critics used that very delay as an argument against the death penalty itself.

Life imprisonment doesn't give the same level of certainty. We don't really know exactly how that sentence will work in the years to come. With the death penalty, we know exactly what will happen.

Justin, I think your response to Krikorian is right. On his logic, repentant Christians in prison should kill themselves, even when they aren't setenced to death, just to show the depth of their remorse.

The death penalty exists for society's convenience more than to punish the murderer. Depending on the prison and the prisoner, life imprisonment might seem far worse than a death sentence. (If you don't believe me, try committing a felony in Mexico.)

If you approach it from that perspective, then the repentant condemned could complain that he shouldn't be killed because he han't suffered enough. Or, as Justin suggests, he could complain that he needs more time for penance and attempts at atonement.

The only logic I can imagine that would lead a penitent condemned to wish his own death would spring from a fear of loss of control: "Kill me before I sin again and sully my soul further." But then, how many opportunities does a prisoner have for egregious sin? And if death is really the only way to avoid further sin, then he needn't wait for the state to act. A racial epithet in the prison lunchroom should do the trick.

If someone was sentenced to 40 years for stealing a pack of Life Savers they could be repentant for the deed but still complain the punishment is unjust.

But if they killed a person in the process of stealing that pack of Life Savers, it wouldn't be unjust.

A life for a life? Perhaps...

But in another discussion we argue over whether an innocent and potent embryo is a human being. Here, in capital punishment cases, we often use the same justification to declare a person INhuman, inhumane, and unfit company for humanity -- so we commit him into the care of the Creator. They right to life, to be a member of Humanity, has been forfeited.

In the case of a fetus, it's "humanity" has yet to be established, but it is nothing if not potential. In the case of Jeffrey Dahmer, his humanity, or lack thereof, has been clearly proven.

All rabid dogs get put down.

Ben Bateman:

"To whom did I apply a caricature, and what non-disprovable assumption did I make?,

You assume that one of the democrat presidents after Truman would have pardoned the Rosenbergs. You applying to them the stereotype of the far left political wing-nuts who were naive to believe that the Soviet Communists were the real heroes of the world. Such people do exist, as you noted of those that consider the Rosenbergs to be martrys, but those are not the views of the democratic party, nor of any US Presedent ever elected.

I was thinking of Kathy Boudin, an unrepentant member of the Weather Underground who killed a security guard in a robbery in 1981. She had been sentenced to life in prison, but became eligible for parole in 2001. In August 2003 she drew a parole board that sympathized with her radical cause, and released her. She is now a celebrity on the far Left.

How do you know the parole board sympathized with her cause? Convicted murderers are frequently released on parole after serving fewer than the 20-plus years Boudin served. You may think 10 years in prison for murder isn't long enough (and I'd agree with you), but that says more about stiff and inflexible sentencing requirements for lesser crimes and over crowded prisons than it does about the political beliefs of parole boards.

Would the Rosenbergs have eventually been freed? I don't know, but it is my impression that others convicted of passing secrets to foreign governments stay in jail a long, long time.

You original question was not if the Rosenbergs would have been paroled, but pardoned, which is essentially saying that the acts they were convicted of should not be treated as a crime. I don't think any American president would have done this.

The claim that Kathy Boudin was unrepentant is simply a lie. She has admitted she was wrong and also accepted responsibility. She served 22 years for her deed, which I think is entirely adequate punishment.

The Apostle Paul was just as guilty of murder as Kathy Boudin and he didn't serve a day in prison for his deed.

What about the notion that capital punishment is a way of recognizing the worth of the victim? That is, when someone commits a heinous and cold-blooded enough murder, if we leave the killer alive, we're in some sense denigrating the worth of the victim, by saying his life wasn't worth as much as the killer's life. I haven't read that much on this topic, so I haven't thought about all the different arguments, but this particular argument has a lot of intuitive weight for me in terms of generally supporting capital punishment. Anybody have a concise explanation of the problem with this line of reasoning?

Currently, approximately 2-3% of all murderers in the United States receive the death penalty. If the claim is that we only value the victim if the death penalty is imposed, then it would seem to me that we would have to give the death penalty in each and every case.

Mike S: when someone commits a heinous and cold-blooded enough murder, if we leave the killer alive, we're in some sense denigrating the worth of the victim ... Anybody have a concise explanation of the problem with this line of reasoning?

My own objection to this argument is that it assumes that the worth of a life is assigned by society. I believe that a human life's worth is inherent from its inception, and cannot be increased or decreased by the choices of any individual or group.

Matt,

The origin of the worth of a human being is, for this particular question, not important, I think. That is, you and I could both believe in the sanctity of human life, but we might have different reasons for doing so. The question I posed regards the recognition of that worth, once the worth has been established.

Mike S,

You are making a distinction between the worth of a life and the extent to which we should recognize that worth. I infer that you believe that the level of recognition should be based on virtue -- the worth of virtuous or innocent lives should be vigorously recognized, whereas the worth of wicked lives should be disregarded. Is this a correct representation of your view?

Dancar: "You assume that one of the democrat presidents after Truman would have pardoned the Rosenbergs. You applying to them the stereotype of the far left political wing-nuts who were naive to believe that the Soviet Communists were the real heroes of the world."

You seem to imagine that you know an awful lot about my psyche. A stereotype applies to a broad group of people. I was thinking of Democratic presidents since the Rosenbergs were convicted---there have been only four by my count---and thinking of the political pressures that would have been brought to bear on them. Democratic presidents don't themselves have to be "far left political wing-nuts" to respond to the far left's demands. Politicians usually do what their supporters demand.

"How do you know the parole board sympathized with [Kathy Boudin's] cause?"

Because someone who attended the hearing described it that way to a columnist, who relayed the description. Google is an amazing thing. You should try it sometime.

Joel Thomas: "The claim that Kathy Boudin was unrepentant is simply a lie."

It's bad form to claim that a given statement is a lie, as the accusation asserts not only the statement's falsity, but the speaker's knowledge of that falsity. You must claim to know something about the speaker's mental state, which is very difficult to do with any certainty. Plus, calling people liars is rude and violates the rules of polite discourse.

The question is what she ought to apologize for. She's willing to say that it was wrong for her to kill people. (Should that make us cheer?) She doesn't seem to have repudiated the ideology that led her to be involved with the robbery, nor does she seem upset about having attempted to steal money. She only seems sorry that people died in the course of the robbery, and that she didn't appreciate the risk that the robbery could lead to murder. Well, duh. I'm sure that every criminal is upset when things go badly in the course of committing a crime.

You can read her letter for yourself; I don't see much repentance in it:
http://www.kathyboudin.com/kbletter.html

Matt,

You are making a distinction between the worth of a life and the extent to which we should recognize that worth. I infer that you believe that the level of recognition should be based on virtue -- the worth of virtuous or innocent lives should be vigorously recognized, whereas the worth of wicked lives should be disregarded. Is this a correct representation of your view?

No, I'm making the assumption that all human lives have the same intrinsic worth. What I'm proposing is that if someone commits cold-blooded murder, their life still has the same intrinsic worth, but they have forfeited their right to have that life protected by the state by their wanton disregard for someone the worth of someone else's life.

In the case of war, I don't think that solidier's lives, on either side, suddenly have less worth due to the fact that they are engaged in warfare, which necessarily entails willfully trying to kill your opponent. In a just war, you are in some sense protecting the lives of citizens against a future infringement of their rights, including the right to live, at the expense of causing the deaths of soldiers and possibly civilians on both sides. But that doesn't mean you think the lives of the citizens you are protecting are worth more (individually speaking) than the lives of those killed in war.

In the case of murder, you are respecting the victim's rights and worth after the fact.

Sorry if this is hopelessly muddled - like I said I haven't thought it out in detail.

Mike S: In a just war, you are in some sense protecting the lives of citizens against a future infringement of their rights ... In the case of murder, you are respecting the victim's rights and worth after the fact.

Do you mean that capital punishment serves a broader goal of strengthening respect for life, beyond the immediate circumstances of the crime? In your view, is executing the killer meant to demonstrate and reinforce society's resolve to uphold the right of all citizens to life?

Yes.

Mike S, I think I understand your proposition now. It does make some sense, though there is something deeply disturbing about it that I can't pinpoint.

You made this point earlier in the discussion:

What I'm proposing is that if someone commits cold-blooded murder, their life still has the same intrinsic worth, but they have forfeited their right to have that life protected by the state...

This argument parallels many other culturally conservative arguments in that it assigns very high value to a social contract. The murderer has not only harmed the individual victim(s), but he has also damaged the social contract regarding life, which if not repaired could allow more murders in the future. A policy of capital punishment is therefore justified because it ultimately saves more lives than it takes.

On other cultural questions, I suggest that conservative positions are similarly contract-centered. Legalized abortion damages the parent-child contract, no-fault divorce and same-sex marriage damage the husband-wife contract, burning the flag damages the citizen-state contract, etc.

So could it be that the central difference in the "culture war" is belief about the value of social contracts, and arguments about various issues (such as the death penalty) flow from that fundamental belief?

"Mike S, I think I understand your proposition now. It does make some sense, though there is something deeply disturbing about it that I can't pinpoint."

If you do figure it out, let me know.

"So could it be that the central difference in the "culture war" is belief about the value of social contracts, and arguments about various issues (such as the death penalty) flow from that fundamental belief?"

I think you're in the right ballpark, but I don't have time to get into it further right now.

Matt, you're definitely getting closer, though the word "contract" is slippery because its most common meaning is an agreement between two people. You seem to be "contract" as shorthand for "social contract," which is a Hobbesian idea of a giant society-wide multi-party agreement.

I don't think that that Hobbesian view really fits with modern American conservatism. It's a fair view of how we want government to work, but it isn't the basis for our morality.

To grasp conservatism, you must think through the details of rejecting moral relativism. Morality's ultimate aim is not a matter of anyone's opinion. Opinions may differ on how to achieve that aim, but the aim itself is objectively correct.

Conservatives are still working hard to fully articulate that aim, still working at discovering that truth. The phrase "culture of life" is the leading idea right now. Morality requires that we live, and history demonstrates abundantly that denies that the specialness of each human life will ultimately lead to quite a lot of death. The thought system that brought us to where we are, that built the prosperity and political stability that we enjoy, is based fundamentally on the idea that each person is a child of God, that each of us carries immense moral worth.

Many societies have tried to deny that basic premise, and all of them (to my knowledge) have led to cruelty and ultimately death. If we are not children of God, then ultimately there is no reason for the strong not to oppress the weak. If we are not children of God, then we are merely animals, and history shows that we will quickly begin acting like animals.

Maybe this phrasing will make more sense for you: What we’re defending in executing murders is not a social contract, but a social ideal, or a shared belief in our own self-perpetuation.

(What follows is an extended and fanciful analogy that may elucidate my own thinking about this. Other conservatives may disagree, and I’m not accusing Matt of being a moral relativist. I just got up some momentum thinking about the Culture of Life, and decided to run with it. This is a first draft. Comments are welcome.)

If you discover a cancerous tumor in your body, you’ll ask your doctor to cut it out. Partly you may do this for the satisfaction of seeing the evil renegade cells removed and killed. Partly you may do this to stop the localized damage that the tumor is doing to some specific part of your body. But mostly you’ll do it to prevent the tumor from growing or spreading. Mostly you’ll do it because you know that the unrestrained growth of cancer cells is incompatible with your body’s continued survival.

Whether they know it or not, your cells exist to keep your body alive, and you live only because most of them do their jobs. Some are useless, and some are harmful but not so harmful as to be a big problem. Your body has a lot of cells in it; it can tolerate some malingerers. But a few cells, such as cancer cells, do things that are so dangerous that your body simply can’t survive if those cells grow and spread. So you have to cut those cells out, or kill them somehow, before they spread their deadly message of unrestrained growth to other cells in your body.

That’s why we kill murderers, and that’s how we select the murderers we kill. We don’t kill over crimes of passion. We don’t kill over death by drunk driving, or negligence. We kill those who premeditate. We kill those who plan it out, who have a chance to cool off and change their minds—but don’t. Those people have an extremely evil idea in their minds: They don’t share one of our fundamental morals. They see nothing wrong with murder. We kill them because they believe that, because we want to stamp out that idea wherever it appears, and because we don’t want that idea to spread to anybody else. We want to make it clear to all the other cells in our body politic: “Attention! Cancer/murder is a bad idea. Don’t do it!”

I don’t what the cells in my body are thinking. Maybe they all want me to live, because they understand that their lives are intimately (though indirectly) tied to mine. Maybe they only do their jobs grudgingly, the way most people pay taxes, and they wish that they could pursue their own happiness free of the evil overlord. Maybe they have free will (or think that they have it), and it just so happens that what they want to do with their free will aligns with what I need them to do for me to stay alive.

I don’t know what the cells in my body are thinking. And I don’t care—as long as they keep me alive. They can build little shrines to me if they want. Some of the cells can enslave and oppress some of the other cells. Some of the cells can swear allegiance to a particular organ or muscle rather than to my body as a whole. The cells can organize a democracy, and draft documents declaring the fundamental rights of cells. They can do what they want—as long as it works.

But I do want them to do what works. That’s my only requirement. They have to keep me alive, and I want them to believe whatever it is that they need to believe to do whatever it is that they need to do to keep me alive. They have to carry nerve signals, or contract and relax at the right time, or produce the right hormone at the right time. The mechanics are very complicated, but the goal is very simple: Life. If my cells don’t do what they should, then I will die, and all my cells will die with me.

Suppose that some brilliant cells in my pancreas develop some profound argument or insight that proves that my pancreas shouldn’t waste its time producing insulin. A council of learned elder pancreatic cells (in black robes) could opine that there is no rational basis for thinking that a pancreas should produce insulin.

And suppose that those cells are right. Suppose their logic is impeccable. Maybe I can produce no counterargument sufficient to convince those insightful cells that a preference for producing insulin is of no more moral significance than a preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate. Sure, maybe a few old-fashioned cells think that it’s a good idea to produce insulin, and they can do that if they really want to. But the rest of them have better things to do. They want to be free to grow and multiply. And metastasize.

Maybe the cells are right. Maybe all of morality is subjective. Maybe a pancreas that doesn’t produce insulin is no better or worse, in the larger picture, than a pancreas that produces insulin. Who are YOU to say that one pancreas is better than another?

Maybe all of that is true. Maybe the rightness or wrongness of a pancreas producing insulin is just a matter of opinion. But this much is fact: If my pancreas suddenly chooses to stop producing insulin, then I will die, my pancreas will die with me, and with its death the brilliant arguments demonstrating the impossibility of moral certainty will die, too.

You can believe if you like that right and wrong are matters of opinion. But life and death are not.

Ben Bateman: Maybe this phrasing will make more sense for you: What we’re defending in executing murders is not a social contract, but a social ideal, or a shared belief in our own self-perpetuation.

Ironic typo ... "executing murders" rather than "executing murderers", but I get what you meant :)

The word ideal is more appropriate than social contract. I did not mean to suggest that the ideals defended by conservatives are invented out of immediate convenience, as the word contract might imply. On the contrary, most conservatives I have spoken with believe their ideals to be ancient and immutable. It seems that we are in agreement on the role of ideals in conservative philosophy.

If you discover a cancerous tumor in your body, you’ll ask your doctor to cut it out. Partly you may do this for the satisfaction of seeing the evil renegade cells removed and killed.

I know you meant this argument to be fanciful, not to be taken too literally, but it sends up all my red flags. Maybe it's because the analogy between unpopular minority groups and cancerous cells was used by the Nazis!!! Surely you don't mean it the way they did, so I'll chalk up my reaction to excessive study of the Holocaust.

On a calmer note, I think there are some points of your argument where we agree. Yes, it's true that people must believe in some higher, universal ideals beyond their own selfish needs, or else we would degenerate into the "law of the jungle". On this basis, one can rationally argue for capital punishment against those who have grossly violated the ideal of life; to do otherwise could be interpreted as a lack of commitment to that ideal.

That said, I think there is a missing element in your conception of morality. You have defined clearly what constitutes good and evil behavior in an individual, but avoided the question of good and evil in the context of society as a whole.

In your cell-body analogy, for example, we might imagine a patient having their appendix removed due to a family history of appendicitis, or having a huge, unsightly mole removed from their face. That's great for the person as a whole, but what about the poor piece of flesh that's cut off? In the real world we're not talking about a mole or an appendix, but about real people who happen to be "undesirable" to the body politic (drug addicts, illegal aliens, welfare moms, etc.)

Liberals tend to put strong emphasis on this social aspect of morality, sometimes to the exclusion of all other moral concerns. Maybe it is an overreaction, but you must admit that the greatest evils in history were committed by whole societies, not lone, deranged individuals. Call it an "ideal of tolerance", in parallel to the other ideals we have discussed. The liberal believes we must uphold the ideal of tolerance at all costs, or risk repeating humanity's worst moments (slavery, the Holocaust, the Inquisition, etc.)

This is not to say that the liberal answer is always the right one. The so-called "ideal of tolerance" should not always trump all our other ideals, but it deserves a place in our shared beliefs.

Ben Bateman: You can believe if you like that right and wrong are matters of opinion. But life and death are not.

I don't think most liberals are moral relativists, to be honest. It probably just looks like moral relativism, because they think "it is absolutely wrong to insist with absolute certainty that you know right from wrong".

OK, that even confused me ...

What I meant was, liberals agree that absolute right and wrong exist. They just don't agree that we humans yet have full understanding of that absolute truth. So it's always "morality as I currently understand it", which can come off sounding like "morality as it suits me".

I understand the concepts behind the argument in favor of the death penalty Ben and Mike S. They are fairly sound in reasoning. And I agree that the premeditative murderer has forfeited all rights to the protections provided by society to law abiding citizens. What I still have trouble with is the finality of it. I think there are other methods of providing for future safety from the murderer without returning the animus. I believe it is well within our surgical means to sever nerve cords so that the convicted murderer would be made into a quadriplegic. This would in effect go far in preventing any further murderous action, provide a rehabilitative aspect in that the convict would have to learn to be dependent on others around them, and finally would spare society the onus of fatal retribution.

"would spare society the onus of fatal retribution"

Why do you think that onus is so large? If I recall correctly, you don't feel the onus is so large when our military kills a terrorist. Why is it so much larger when killing a murderer?

On other cultural questions, I suggest that conservative positions are similarly contract-centered. Legalized abortion damages the parent-child contract, no-fault divorce and same-sex marriage damage the husband-wife contract, burning the flag damages the citizen-state contract, etc.

I agree with Ben that "contract" is not quite the right word. I think "moral law" or "natural law" is more apt. Legalized abortion violates the natural law against killing innocent human beings. For no-fault divorce contract might be closer to being correct, in that it makes a mockery of the promise between husband and wife, and between the couple and God. Perhaps flag-burning fits in here, too. Same sex marriage defies the natural law that defines the nexus of marriage, marital sex, and procreation.

In the case of murder, I generally agree with Ben that the individual has defied a social contract, and that the society must punish such defiance sufficiently to make the message clear that such behavior is unacceptable. But that is not really the case I'm trying to make. I'm saying something more along the lines that the murderer has violated the natural law against killing innocent people. As Ben said, they did it with premeditation and total disregard for the fundamental right to life. The only way to justly punish such an action is to take the life of the offender. This is irrespective of the larger societal effects, or whether anyone will be more or less inclined to kill in the future based upon the case in question. It's a matter of justice. If you don't take the life of the offender, you are implicitly saying that their life is worth more than the victim's. Roughly speaking, it would be like saying that if someone robbed a store of $1000, but you only made them return $500 of it. We would all recognize that as unjust. If someone can explain how the symmetry breaks down between that situation and murder, I'd like to hear it.

I think this view of things ties in with Ben's larger societal point, in that a society that properly recognizes the moral law will end up being more healthy & successful. Likewise, to the extent a society doesn't recognize the moral law, it will be less healthy & successful. But justice follows from following the moral law, irrespective of the societal effects.

"In the case of capital punishment, the Catechism frames punishment from essentially two perspectives: that of the public and that of the criminal."

Notice the difference between, apparently, the Catechism, and my account: the victim.

Mike S: Roughly speaking, it would be like saying that if someone robbed a store of $1000, but you only made them return $500 of it. We would all recognize that as unjust. If someone can explain how the symmetry breaks down between that situation and murder, I'd like to hear it.

In the robbery case, the victim is compensated, so the harm to the victim is somewhat reduced. However, execution of a murderer gives nothing to the victim, since they are already dead. It would be like asking a robber who stole $1000 to burn another $1000 of their own money as punishment.

Mike S: I agree with Ben that "contract" is not quite the right word. I think "moral law" or "natural law" is more apt.

I agree with you that the word contract is not the best choice, since it does not convey the gravity of the moral imperatives it carries. Nonetheless, it does seem that the concept of an agreement between parties is central. Even the religious concept of moral law or natural law could be framed as such, i.e. an ancient covenant between humanity and God.

Mike S said:

"Why do you think that onus is so large? If I recall correctly, you don't feel the onus is so large when our military kills a terrorist. Why is it so much larger when killing a murderer?"

The onus for killing terrorists is still there Mike. I have never said there was not an onus for killing. Even when killing in self defense there is an onus. That is the difference between killing a terrorist on the battlefield as opposed to killing a murderer in your custody and under your control. On the battlefield there is the immediacy of action that necessitates the use of deadly force in self defense. The same would be true at the moment of arresting the premeditative murderer and that murderer were to resist arrest with deadly force. Once the murderer is under the control of the arresting officer (and by extension the courts and jail system), then killing him takes on the same onus as has the premeditative murder.

With self defense, even though the killing is still a crime, it can be and usually is an excusable crime. If you think there is no onus attached to killing terrorists on the battlefield I suggest you talk to a few soldiers who have had to kill in action. It affects them even when the deadly force is justifiable. The same is true of police and the use of deadly force.

An execution is premeditated. As Ben said of the murderer, the court/society has had a chance to cool off, but the decision is still made to kill the convict. There is something intrinsically wrong about that idea.

If you don't take the life of the offender, you are implicitly saying that their life is worth more than the victim's. Roughly speaking, it would be like saying that if someone robbed a store of $1000, but you only made them return $500 of it. We would all recognize that as unjust. If someone can explain how the symmetry breaks down between that situation and murder, I'd like to hear it.

Well, for one thing, in the case of execution, it would be like the government taking the $1,000 from the thief just to burn it. Killing the killer doesn't give the victim his or her life back.

Of course, Matt said exactly the same thing. Oops.

"Well, for one thing, in the case of execution, it would be like the government taking the $1,000 from the thief just to burn it. Killing the killer doesn't give the victim his or her life back."

Obviously. I guess the basic dichotomy on this point has to do with what the implications of that are. A crude way of putting it is that the life taken is worth X. Imprisoning the murderer for life extracts Y worth of punishment. Executing them extracts Z worth of punishment. Z = X, if we say all human lives are of equal worth. Y

I guess the way you and Matt are looking at things is that once someone is dead, there is no way to compensate them for their loss (i.e. Z != X), so you're basically taking them out of the equation. That just doesn't feel right to me, though I can't quite articulate why. I just can't remove that person from the calculation, even after they are dead. Perhaps part of this has to do with the distinction between ultimate (i.e. God's) justice, and earthly, legal, justice. We shouldn't confuse the two. It's possible that I'm trying to achieve too much of the former with the latter. But it offends me on some fairly deep level that a cold-blooded murderer can keep living for many years while his victim had that opportunity unjustly taken away.

smmtheory,

"If you think there is no onus attached to killing terrorists on the battlefield I suggest you talk to a few soldiers who have had to kill in action."

I didn't mean to imply that there is no onus - I was referring to the difference in onus between battlefield killing and capital punishment.

You've made a reasonable case for the difference with this,

"An execution is premeditated. As Ben said of the murderer, the court/society has had a chance to cool off, but the decision is still made to kill the convict. There is something intrinsically wrong about that idea."

But just war, and it's resultant killing, is premeditated, too. The killing done is justified by other concerns. The question is the same for capital punishment. The point at issue is whether killing a murderer is intrinsically wrong (or at least whether its wrongness is outweighed by other factors that justify it). You can't just state the issue under question without arguing for it - why is it intrinsically wrong? Or why does it's wrongness outweigh the other factors, contrary to the calculation in just wars?

Mike S.,
You are right. I didn't articulate why I think it is intrinsically wrong compared to the action of fighting in a just war.

In order to consider whether or not a war is just we not only have to weigh the gains/merits such as the security of our nation, but we also have to weigh the onus of doing nothing to achieve justice, or to put it another way, overlooking great injustice being committed. In the case of going to war in Iraq, we were under the onus of having left Saddam Hussein in power to continue his murderous reign back during the first Gulf War. This is at least how I see it.

When considering the sentence of the murderer, the onus of doing nothing to the murderer would weigh on society. This is the parallel to doing nothing by avoiding a just war. Taking away the murderer's freedom (the surgical removal of use of limbs) would counter that onus. But that in and of itself still doesn't explain why the premeditation of fighting a just war is less intrinsically wrong than executing a killer.

What also has to be weighed is the possibility of making a mistake. When we have mistakenly convicted and executed a person for premeditated murder we occur the onus of killing an innocent being. It is quite a bit different when prosecuting a war. If we accidently prosecute a war, it most likely won't have the totality of a death sentence for the other nation as it would for the murderer. There should still be citizens alive to make reparations to on a national level, much as we did with Japan after WWII. It seems to me that it would also be more difficult to mistakenly prosecute a war. In this case, the evidence of the atrocities committed under the leadership of Saddam Hussein were well documented. He could have humbly submitted to the demands of the world at the end of the Gulf War, and I am sure that the U.S. would have gone to great lengths to repair the damaged infrastructure. Instead he bristled and remained defiant and hostile.

Mike S.: ...it offends me on some fairly deep level that a cold-blooded murderer can keep living for many years while his victim had that opportunity unjustly taken away.

That is a common reaction, and in some cases I feel the same way as you, on an emotional level anyway. Almost anybody would feel that way if the victim were someone they loved.

The question is, do you think our instinctive desire for retribution is compatible with a reasoned approach to justice? Think of a less serious, but analogous situation: you are cut off in traffic by an obnoxious, reckless driver. In the heat of the moment, most people would probably love to launch a missile and blow up the other car, but on reflection, the same people would agree that violence is not a reasonable response.

"What also has to be weighed is the possibility of making a mistake."

I think it's a plausible argument that the risk of making a mistake outweighs the justice achieved by executing a murderer (though it doesn't directly address the issue I raised of retributive justice). I am quite sympathetic to the arguments that our capital punishment system, as presently constituted, isn't just. There will always be some non-zero risk of executing an innocent person. I'm just not convinced that that level of risk is sufficient to outweight the concerns of justice, and the other societal effects that Ben referred to above. And there will always be cases where there is no chance of error: Brian Nichols being the most recent example.

Matt,

"The question is, do you think our instinctive desire for retribution is compatible with a reasoned approach to justice?"

Well, that's what I'm trying to get at, isn't it?

I'd say that a universal instinct is a good clue pointing towards the natural law. It does need to be examined rationally, yes. But most societies have had capital punishment - Western societies were the ones that implemented controls to make sure it wasn't carried out hastily.

I'd also say that nobody has yet shown me a rational argument that rules out capital punishment, even if I don't have a full rational defense of it. Some suggestive analogies have been employed, and the risk of error raised, but I haven't yet seen a rational argument that lays out a convincing case against capital punishment.

Mike,
You said:

"I think it's a plausible argument that the risk of making a mistake outweighs the justice achieved by executing a murderer (though it doesn't directly address the issue I raised of retributive justice)."

That is because I do not believe justice is served by/through retribution. I think the societal protection aspect of the penal system is too often confused with retributive justice. While the majority of society may only be able to understand it instinctively as retributive justice, I believe Jesus urges us to move beyond that. Jesus urges us to modify society to distinguish between retribution and societal protection. This is a facet of Jesus' lesson in turning the other cheek.

In some cases there is justice in a deliberate display of public mercy. But it is not mercy if we rule out the death penalty for every instance of murder.

The victim is not just the individual murdered, but also society. A debt has been incurred in our community. The account must be settled in the here and now.

We cannot know if societal justice is God's justice. In executing the murderer, society cannot presume to be the hand of God. We exercise our prudential judgement, not God's absolute judgement. This is not supposed to be easy for the murderer, nor for society. Each case is a test, a trial, in a societal sense.

Murder is a public crime and execution is an expression of public morality that values the dignity and worth of each human being. The murderer took an innocent life from society; he now owes society his own life. It is a forfiet made by the murderer, not a retribution sought by society. The exchange was initiated by the criminal and it will be completed with his own end. In a civilized society that completion will be done reluctantly, not with vengance. It will be done as recognition of the individual's free will and the imbalance struck by the willful crime.

When a soldier in war dies in performance of duty, we say that he has made the ultimate sacrifice. When a victim is murdered, no less a sacrifice was made. But it is incomplete as the duty is left to society to perform.

There may be a utilitarian argument about state executions providing a public deterrence, on one side, or about the display of public mercy (i.e. holding the hand of the State) even for the most hienous crime. But in principle what matters is the societal standard that expresses public morality with compassion. A murder is a public crime and its penalty cannot be paid in private atonement alone. One may hope for, indeed pray for, repentance on the part of the murderer. But we cannot know that repentance has been realized. That is knowable by God alone. We can only do what we can do with our own human hands. And inescapably, societal justice is in our hands. Punting is not an option.

It seems to me that our sociey takes excruciating care to capture, rather than to seek and destory, the person who has committed premediated murder. We then provide due process of law, not as a privilege, but as protection of the accused human being in our midst. We attempt to compensate for the necessary imbalance between the power of the State and the vulnerability of the detained individual. We do this calmly and, yes, with deliberate force -- and where warranted with lethal force. That we do so calmly is to our credit and is not a reason in itself to deny justice. These are human measures, and cannot be perfected. But the lack of perfection ought not to guarantee that a murderer can, in effect, be declared bancrupt and incapable of paying his debt to society.

Thus, I do not think that we can simply say that providing safeguards in the pursuit of justice in the here and now should remove the death penalty from the means to fight against premeditated murder and the rejection of public morality that such an atrocious crime expresses. An argument on principle, rather than hesitation or reluctance, is where the availability of the death penalty needs to be decided by society.

Even the self-confessed guilty man might seek atonement after his crime, but the certainty of his own death is not a tool by which to hurry his repentance nor to heal the wounds felt by his victim's survivors. It is the completion of the bloodied transaction that the criminal imposed on society.

Let's look at it another way.

Let's suppose for the sake of argument, that a killer planned and committed a premeditated murder. In the process of doing so there was a witness. Let us further assume that the witness knew the murderer, knew the murder was planned in advance. Also, the murderer knew about the witness but left the witness alive due to harboring no animosity toward the witness.

Now, for whatever reason, the witness decides after thinking about it for a while that because the victim was important to him(her)self that the murderer needed to atone with his or her own life. So the witness then head over to exact punishment on the murderer. Once the witness gets to the murderers house, the witness finds the murderer absent so waits until murderer returns home.

Now if the witness kills the murderer in this premeditated act, the authorities will, once they catch them, charge the witness with the same crime they would have charged the original murderer.

The question now is, why is it not okay for the witness to kill the original murderer when it would have been okay to have been done by the authorities? Or conversely, why is it okay for the authorities to kill the murderer, but not for the witness to?

Due process. As in a just war, the means must also be just.

Pardon me for saying so, but that's not much of an answer F. Rottles. What is it about due process that grants the power of life and death?

smmtheory,

What if you replaced your example with a theft, instead of a murder? Would it be morally acceptable for the witness to forcibly retrieve the stolen items, and to detain the thief for an extended period of time as punishment? I'm assuming that you think it is acceptable for the state to lock up a thief and make restitution to the victim, but that it would be problematic for an individual to do so. If so, then your analogy doesn't quite work, since you are reaching a different conclusion vis-a-vis the actions of the state and individual in the case of a murder. If not, then I'd be interested to hear your explanation of which action is or is not problematic in the case of a thief.

Mike S.,
Granted my analogy was not perfect, but first of all, let's put everything into a little bit of perspective. 1) Theft (the taking of something unlawfully) is property crime, 2) Robbery (using force to take something from somebody) is a crime against persons.

It is my understanding that either a person cannot commit theft by taking their own property back, or it is an excusable crime. At least in Kentucky. To commit robbery to get your property back would be excessive. Conversely, using force to retrieve your property as it is being wrestled away from you is excusable. In effect, the punishment fits the crime so to speak.

Going back to the situation where the first victim took their property back as well as having incarcerated the first thief, then the incarceration would be considered excessive since restitution of property was already made. But more to your point, the theft analogy doesn't work the same way because you've substituted the death (deprivation of life) parameter with incarceration (temporary deprivation of liberty). You're considering unequal outcomes.

Either way, due to the finality of a death sentence, it only seems reasonable to expect a higher standard for whether or not society has an interest in using that sort of punishment rather than incarceration.

Sure, it might be legal. Sure, precedent for use goes back even further than Jesus. But I'd like to point out that in the gospels, when Jesus was brought an adulteress whose sentence carried the death penalty, he didn't argue the legality of the death sentence, he only suggested that the one without sin cast the first stone.

smmtheory -- "What is it about due process that grants the power of life and death?"

Due process does not grant this power. Rather, it tempers it.

The murderer gave-up his life when he committed the crime. Due process is the means by which society determines guilt and assigns the proportionate penalty. It is how we safeguard against vigilante reactions.

Consider the previous example of the person who witnessed a murder and subsequently takes matters into his own hands. He lacked the authority to kill the original murderer. In fact, he became a criminal himself. As such he is also subject to right authority, due process, and a proportionate penalty. He did not merely kill, he murdered, and thus gave-up his life.

F. Rottles said:

"He lacked the authority to kill the original murderer."

Didn't you see this next question coming? So where does the authority of the state over life and death come from? Did we vote specifically to give that authority to the state? It seems to me that it's never come up and it has only been a side issue. The government took it upon itself that it had the authority. Whomever was voted into office that thought the government should have the authority didn't get there specifically on that platform. The converse would also be true that whomever was voted into office that did not think the government should have that authority didn't get there specifically on that platform. What grants the state power of life and death?

"Sure, it might be legal. Sure, precedent for use goes back even further than Jesus. But I'd like to point out that in the gospels, when Jesus was brought an adulteress whose sentence carried the death penalty, he didn't argue the legality of the death sentence, he only suggested that the one without sin cast the first stone."

This is exactly my point: justice requires forfeiting one's life (in the case of murder). Grace is something given by God, not something man can bestow. On a personal level, a Christian whose loved one has been murdered is called to demonstrate God's love for him to the murderer (love thine enemy). (The details of how to do this are left to the individual, circumstances, and the Holy Spirit.) But that doesn't mean that the requirements of justice are wiped away. We've touched on this point in an earlier discussion, but society is not called to exhibit God's grace in the same way that an individual Christian is, or that the Church might be.

Just found this quote from John Paul II (from his statement on World Peace Day 2002) on Donald Sensing's blog:

"But forgiveness is the opposite of resentment and revenge, not of justice."

Mkie S.
You do realize, don't you, that John Paul II advocated an end to the death penalty? I'm just wondering how you think the statement you excerpted fits in with his philosophy in that regard.

Mike S. you said:

"This is exactly my point: justice requires forfeiting one's life (in the case of murder). Grace is something given by God, not something man can bestow."

Heavenly Grace I agree with you on, but man can bestow personal grace and society can even bestow societal grace.

you also said:

"On a personal level, a Christian whose loved one has been murdered is called to demonstrate God's love for him to the murderer (love thine enemy). (The details of how to do this are left to the individual, circumstances, and the Holy Spirit.) But that doesn't mean that the requirements of justice are wiped away."

I don't recall ever saying that the requirement of justice is or would be wiped away without the death penalty. What I am saying is that the requirement of the justice of a life for a life is in God's providence, not ours.

and you also said:

"We've touched on this point in an earlier discussion, but society is not called to exhibit God's grace in the same way that an individual Christian is, or that the Church might be."

Scripture seems to indicate otherwise in Matthew 25:31-46.

"What I am saying is that the requirement of the justice of a life for a life is in God's providence, not ours."

But the state is charged with keeping order, in accordance with the moral law, in Christian theology, isn't it? Why is justice for the taking of an innocent life solely God's providence, but justice for other wrongs is not?

"Scripture seems to indicate otherwise in Matthew 25:31-46."

I said in the same way, not that nations aren't collectively responsible for their actions. For example, both the individual and the state are responsible for helping the poor, but each has different actions they are called to take to achieve that end.

Mike,

Do you really need this answered?

Why is justice for the taking of an innocent life solely God's providence, but justice for other wrongs is not?

"Do you really need this answered?"

Sure - it would seem to be the answer to my original question, wouldn't it?

In the second comment, you said,

Actually, my understanding is that the proscription against retribution as an end in itself is a more fundamental holding of the Catholic Church than just for dealing with criminals. In the case of capital punishment, the Catechism frames punishment from essentially two perspectives: that of the public and that of the criminal.

But you didn't explain the basis for the proscription against retribution, or why the Catechism frames punishment from those two (and only those two) perspectives.

Oops. Only "really" was supposed to be ital... didn't mean to be that vehement!

Why is justice for the taking of an innocent life solely God's providence, but justice for other wrongs is not?

First, justice in such cases is only "solely God's provinence" if you define justice as a life for a life. Second, the reason that is God's provinence is that only God should have power over life and death as a matter of judgment.

Sorry not to go on (and I'm not avoiding the other part of your comment). I'm exhausted and have to get some sleep.

Mike S., you asked:

"Why is justice for the taking of an innocent life solely God's providence, but justice for other wrongs is not?"

It may sound trite at this point to fall back on an old proverb, but let me start by saying two wrongs don't make a right. If a person is of the mind that taking a human life is wrong whether it is excusable or not, then this might make it an easier concept to grasp. In order to accept that society has the right to end the life of a murderer, a person has to wittingly or unwittingly first concede that the rights of society trump the rights of God. It may sound harsh for me to say it like that. But I'm fairly certain that you agree that nobody but God can know the hearts of men. As such, only God can know if the criminal would eventually repent. Society cannot, and when society assumes it has the right to take the criminal's life, it is circumventing God's infinite mercy in removing any further opportunity for the sinner to rethink and recant their actions. You do believe that once you are dead you can take no further actions to affect the outcome of your judgement, correct? This is why there is a difference between the justice that takes a life and the justice that doesn't take a life. Rehabilitation can only be undertaken by the living.

Rehabilitation does not remove the mortal sin of murder. That crime cannot be undone on earth.

My view is that the nature of murder is such that the criminal has demeaned his own human dignity to the extent that his life (on earth) is no longer his own. It does not belong to the rest of society either. But he has given up his own life by taking innocent life.

The duty of those in authority (including jury members and other fact finders) is to perform their duty in fairly applying earthly justice and to leave the criminal's soul to God's judgement. Even if we wanted to attend to the criminal's soul, it is beyond our jurisdiction. Whether he dies now or later his soul is still in God's hands, not ours.

The power of life and death is rightly exercised by legitimate authority in restoring order to the disorder created by murder.

It remains a prudential judgement as to whether or not the death penalty is to be abolished, putunder moratorium, or instituted and maintained. For instance, I think JPII was pretty clear that the culture of death has made such inroads that a moratorium, if not abolishment, is preferred as it would help reverse the tide. I do not think he or the Church has ever taught that the death penalty is in itself an impermissable exercise of temporal authority.

There are factors to weigh in addition to the raw act of taking the life of the murderer. For example, does the criminal pose a threat to prison guards? Or does his imprisonment strike an imbalance in societal justice? Does a public act of mercy bring order in the wake of his crime? Is it inhumane to lock a human being away for a lifetime? And so forth.

As I said earlier, this is not supposed to be easy for society. I do think that JPII's concern about turning the tide is also a significant factor to weight purdentially in all societies, not just our own today.

F Rottles said:

"There are factors to weigh in addition to the raw act of taking the life of the murderer. For example, does the criminal pose a threat to prison guards? Or does his imprisonment strike an imbalance in societal justice? Does a public act of mercy bring order in the wake of his crime? Is it inhumane to lock a human being away for a lifetime? And so forth."

I believe I specifically answered these questions earlier, but in case I didn't I'll reiterate. The prisoner would no longer pose a threat to prison guards or any guards if they were surgically made into quadriplegics. Not having the use of arms and legs with which to effect another murder specifically addresses the needs of societal protection. This sort of imprisonment should strike a balance for societal purposes in that it is a harsh punishment. More punishment than mercy if you ask me as the convict would be at the mercy of the world/society for the rest of his life. It would provide opportunity for rehabilitation. Notice I said opportunity, not guaranteed rehabilitation. Rehab would require a choice made by the convicted murderer. If you consider killing another human being humane, I don't know how to answer you question about whether life imprisonment is humane or not. In my opinion, removing the prisoners humanity is the ultimate in being inhumane. But making the convict a prisoner for life is all that society can naturally expect for restoration of order. Anything else, as I have stated earlier is society stepping beyond its boundaries.

If advocating that the death penalty be stopped is not recognizable by you as the Pope and the Church teaching that it is an impermissable exercise of temporal authority, how much stronger a statement are you asking for? Would those specific words be enough for people to believe?

ssmtheory, how might it be conducive to the promotion of the culture of life to equate quadriplegism with a life sentence for the most heinous of crimes?

I imagine that your point is more rhetorical than practical. You want us to think of taking the life, not of an innocent or guilty person, but of a defenceless person. Fair enough.

You objected to the government having the power to execute the murderer. You questioned the authority and the penalty itself. It is clear that the Church and JPII haven't taught that legitimate authority could never execute justly; and they have not taught that the death penalty itself is absolutely wrong in all circumstances.

What is at issue? The circumstances under which our prudential judgement ought to favor life over death in the case of premeditated murder.

Nope, what I am suggesting is the quadriplegic sentence as a method for protecting society. I am suggesting that as an alternative to the death penalty. I believe you are incorrect that the church does not teach that execution can be done justly. That was not always the case, but it has begun since John Paul II became Pope. U.S. Bishops have been advocating the repeal of the death penalty and teaching against the death penalty for several years now. I will attempt to find you examples of this teaching, but I don not guarantee success as I have a limited time to go searching for it until the end of the semester. I personally am telling you that society should not seek the retributive aspect of penal sentencing through the death penalty. It is wrong for several reasons which I have gone to a bit of trouble to explain. On plain non-religious terms, I can do no better to explain it. This is a matter of faith. If you can accept on faith that God's mercy is infinite, then it shouldn't be hard for you to accept that killing another human being is wrong even if it is excusable in cases like self-defense. In non-religious parlance of court understanding. Killing in self-defense is a situation of the lesser of two evils. Execution of criminals does not have the imminent-danger-of-death aspect that killing in self-defense does. Some traditions do deserve change or elimination. The death penalty is one of them. Citizens can learn to do without it.

The simple fact that we would no longer be a society that executes people for the most heinous act of murder makes a statement for the culture of life that we respect every life. Even the life of those who know no respect for it themselves. The sentence of enforced quadriplegia, though not the perfect solution, would affirm the interdependency of all human life. And of course, it can never be repeated enough, it would leave open the possibility of remorse, and repentence instead of ending it prematurely.

Well, to begin with, you can refer to the Catechism:

If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people's safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.

Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm - without definitely taking away from him the possibility of redeeming himself - the cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity "are very rare, if not practically nonexistent."

Justin,

The Catechism references Genesis 9:5-6 above: "For your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning. . . . Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image."

Then it says,

The efforts of the state to curb the spread of behavior harmful to people's rights and to the basic rules of civil society correspond to the requirement of safeguarding the common good. Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense. When it is willingly accepted by the guilty party, it assumes the value of expiation. Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people's safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must contribute to the correction of the guilty party.

Then just before the part you quote, it says,

Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.

I'm sure there is a more in-depth teaching of this somewhere, but as written the Catechism doesn't explain how the conclusion is reached that "authority will limit itself to such [non-lethal] means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person." It also does not spell out why preserving the possibility of redemption takes precedence over the reckoning quoted in Genesis. I'm not saying it shouldn't, necessarily, just that I'd like to hear what the argument is.

As a matter of curiosity, it would be interesting to know what the relative rates of repentance & accepting Christ are for people on death row, vs. murderers serving life sentences.

ssmtheory -- "This is a matter of faith. If you can accept on faith that God's mercy is infinite, then it shouldn't be hard for you to accept that killing another human being is wrong even if it is excusable in cases like self-defense."

This is where we differ, although it appears we are both devout Catholics and JPII was the spiritual father of us both. His teaching is that, in the context of a society in which the culture of death has become ascendant, the hand of the State ought to be restrained even in the case of premeditated murder. And various other factors need to be taken into the balance.

It is not a matter of faith alone. We must exercise our judgement in the here and now. As much as I admire JPII, he is a man first and foremost. He wisely advised us to promote a culture of life in the here and now. I do not think that your equating quadriplegia with a lifetime punishment for murder is conducive to that deeper goal. Yes, on this, I disagree with the prudential judgement of JPII. And I do not take that lightly at all.

State-imposed quadriplegia is not much different than shackling the arms and legs of the murderer and throwing away the key. If we remove his capability to act on his own free will, he cannot demonstrate rehabitilation.

Your proposal would replace death row with a hospital ward in which murderers would be rendered defenceless through surgery, or perhaps drug-induced paralysis, or perhaps amputation. We might as well authorize the government to induce severe brain damage or place the murder in a coma. This does not respect the dignity of human being, in my view, because it simply removes the exercise of free will. I don't see such options as expedient nor useful in all circumstances, if in any at all. It does seem like a form of permament torture. And, unlike the innocent quadriplegic person, the defenceless murderer is profoundly guilty and has incurred a debt that he cannot pay to us.

Yes, execution removes life itself, but it redresses the disorder created by the murder himself. His execution is not triggered by our hand but by his own.

In any case, I also would favor a justice system that reserves the ultimate sentence for premediated murder in cases where we have tempered the power of those in authority with diligence of due process. There is nothing magical about due process of law, but it is what we human beings have and it is our duty to seek justice with just means.

We differ on what is the ultimate sentence that ought to be available to right authority. For me it is not a test of my faith, nor a test of my capacity for love and mercy, but rather a test of my support for what can only be an imperfect solution to crimes that standout as examples of the very opposite of the culture of life.

In describing state-induced quadriplegia as a form of torture, I do not mean that quadriplegia is itself torture as experienced by the innocent. It is torture in the context of punishment in the penal system.

What ssmtheory advocates is very like cutting off the hand of a theif or the tongue of a perjurer. It does not seem like it would be an advancement in the exercise of justice, to me at least.

It also does not spell out why preserving the possibility of redemption takes precedence over the reckoning quoted in Genesis.

Well, that gets right to the heart of New Testament/Old Testament exegesis.