Justin --

I'm glad to see, in the comments to a post in which I responded to some of his thoughts on cloning, that Phil Bowermaster takes others' speculation about the disposition of his soul seriously enough to take offense.

Taking exception is not that same as taking offense. I wasn't offended in the least. I grew up in western Kentucky surrounded by fundamentalists who were convinced that I was going to hell because the church my family belonged to committed such grievous errors as using musical instruments in worship and allowing women to wear pants. I disagreed with their views, but their condemnation of us — or rather, what they might have called their "reminders of the judgment that is God's perogative" — never hurt my feelings. After all, I knew that deep down we were on the same side, even if their dogma forced them to conclude otherwise.

I find myself in much the same position with you and your readers. I don't share your view that there is a self-evident Christian answer to the question of "when does human life begin?" (I believe that this is one of the many answers that God has left for us to discover ourselves, using the senses and capacity for rational thought that He gave us.) Much less do I share your view that all Christians necessarily and by definition must see eye-to-eye on these issues.

However, I fully respect the conclusions that your beliefs lead you to. Anyone who advocates killing human beings, or using them as some kind of medical "product," is all of the things you and your readers made me out to be: a monster, a fiend, etc. I'm inclined (not necessarily convinced, but heading that way) to agree that your definition of when human life begins should become the standard, not because I think it's right, but because I recognize that there are many good people out there who are simply not able to recognize that any other standard could possibly be moral.

If there are alternatives, we should pursue them. We would only need to revisit the "tiresome argument" if it turns out that adopting this stricter standard is costing us too much.

"We would only need to revisit the "tiresome argument" if it turns out that adopting this stricter standard is costing us too much."

So, human dignity has its price. What is your price, Phil?

"I don't share your view that there is a self-evident Christian answer to the question of "when does human life begin?""

It's not a 'Christian' answer - it's an obvious biological answer. A fertilized egg is a unique human individual, genetically and physically. The only question is whether to arbitrarily deny it protection because one claims that it is not a person. Your own comments seem to indicate that if there were no medically useful benefits to destroying the embryo, that you would be inclined to afford it protection. In other words, the personhood of a human being depends upon it's utility, or lack thereof, to others. Now you see why the analogy to slavery is used.

I also note that in your previous comments you use the familiar tactic of calling a human embryo 'just a blob of cells'. But of course it is not 'just a blob of cells', or else you wouldn't be interested in using it for research and/or therapy. It's precisely because the embryonic cells have special capabilities that we argue over them. Besides, we're all just 'blobs of cells' - but that doesn't give us the right to pick certain individuals to be destroyed because the rest of us might benefit from their tissues.

On the issue of abortion, I've always thought that the best argument that pro-lifers can make to undecideds goes something like this:

"Okay, you're not convinced that a person - a baby - is destroyed by an abortion. We on our side of the issue say emphatically that it is a person - that a baby is killed by this procedure. The folks on the other side will tell you emphatically that it's not a baby, that it's just the removal of unwanted tissue.

So here we are at an impasse. Let me suggest that when there is a doubt about something as important as life, the issue should be resolved on the side of life."

This, I think, is a powerful argument for pro-lifers. It doesn't ask the uncommitted to adopt pro-life values. All they have to do is to accept the possibility that pro-lifers might be right. This line of thinking has persuaded most of the country to be uncomfortable with abortion on demand. For the record I think that is a good thing.

But this argument doesn't logically work when pro-lifers argue against embryonic stem cell research. Instead of "arguable human life v. certain death" (which is the abortion debate), the argument is "arguable life v. the sick patient in front of us."

On the one hand we have a few undifferentiated cells in a dish. You would argue that there is a person in that dish. Some will believe it. Most won't.

In this group of cells there is no nervous system, no heart, lungs, or any other differientiated tissue. In nature this group of cells could go on to form a single baby, identical twins, or, rarely, it could be part of a person (when two blastocysts join to become a single individual called a chimera). Quite often this group of cells fails to implant or thrive - therefore no baby results.

If nature hasn't decided if this group of cells is to become one baby, two babies, part of a baby, or no baby, then what you are looking at isn't a baby yet.

On the other hand nobody can argue against the person-hood of the suffering patient.

Even we monsters hope to reach a point where all the potential of embryonic stem cells will be realized without using embryonic stem cells. But if a suffering patient needs embryonic stem cells, it shouldn't be denied to them.

The following is from an article by Ramesh Ponnuru in the latest National Review:

I have followed (and participated in) the debate over stem-cell research since it became a national issue four years ago. In my experience, opponents of the research rarely bring up the possibility that embryos have souls. Slightly more often, religious supporters of the research will suggest that they do not have souls. The context in which the question of ensoulment most frequently comes up, however, is precisely the one in which it has come up here: the false suggestion by supporters that a view of ensoulment is what motivates opponents. ...

It may be said that apparently reasoned arguments against embryo destruction are really rationalizations for religious views. The opponents are overwhelmingly evangelicals and Catholics. It is certainly possible that our reasoning goes wrong because we are influenced by extra-rational, unacknowledged factors. But the reasoning of people from different religious traditions or none can go wrong, too. Atheists may have their own forms of rationalization, as do we all. Self-consciously secular thinkers can generate their own orthodoxies. Liberals tend to assume, without reflection, that the rational view of an issue is the one that most non-religious people take. The idea that a religious tradition could strengthen people's reason — could help them reach rationally sound conclusions they might not otherwise reach — rarely occurs to them. ...

Liberalism's hymns to reason always end up truncating reason. They are pleas for open debate designed to rule things out of debate. John Rawls himself notoriously ruled that arguments against abortion could not meet the test of his "public reason" (a position from which he later backed away). To someone unsympathetic to liberals, it must begin to look like a kind of trick. Let us imagine a conservative who says that abortion should be illegal because it kills human beings. His liberal friend responds that this sort of theological talk is inadmissible in a democracy because it violates the rules of open debate. We can see that this liberal has misrepresented his friend's views and shut down the discussion — all in the name of reasoned argument. Yet that conversation happens all the time in our politics, and somehow we don't see it.

I think that this describes Phil's outlook fairly well. While he's willing to respect the anti-ES research position, he's not really respecting it as a rational argument. He's giving it respect because he respects other people's religious convictions, but he's placing the argument in the category of subjective personal beliefs, instead of addressing the argument on its merits.

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Stephen, you make some reasonable points from a practical political standpoint. There is no doubt that the suffering of Michael J. Fox and Christopher Reeve is more emotionally compelling than an embryo in a petri dish. But if we are trying to determine the morally correct policies, then your arguments are worthless. Your statement,

But if a suffering patient needs embryonic stem cells, it shouldn't be denied to them.

But if a suffering patient needs a live-donor kidney, it shouldn't be denied to them.

The moral questions become obvious. It's only if you presuppose that the embryo has no moral standing that your statement makes any sense. But that is the question under debate.

Mike,

I just want to note that I trimmed your quote a little, not for any reason hostile to the points, but just to avoid over-snagging content from a magazine that hasn't even hit the stands yet.

I don't think I lost any important aspects of the passage for our purposes here.

I don't ee that there is a questiona at all of whne human life begins - biologically, it begins when a human sperm fertilizes a human egg - conception. Being no scientist, it seems what this new approach is saying is that - yes, human life begins at conception, but is what we are concieving really human life if it the cdx gene or whatever is not included/shut off. And if we can manipulate human gametes to such an extent that what they conceive can never develop even into a one celled human organism, are we killing a human life? How different/damaged/mutated or thwarted (pick your term) must this entity conceived be before it is considered to be a human being that has been conceived? Now, if my understanding of the question is incorrect, and what is being is discussed is in fact the conception of human being that immediately and inevitably goes developmentally astray by design, then it is really no different from a typical abortion. In other words, is the mutation/difference something effected pre or post-conception?

Mike:

I don't want to speak for Phil, but I'm not saying that you or Justin are irrational. If you believe that the cells in that petri dish are a person, yours is the only humane position-and humane is rational.

Consider the posibility that I am also rational, that I love kids, that I'm against euthanasia, that I'm pro-life, and that after considering the issue, I came to a different conclusion.

"Stephen, you make some reasonable points from a practical political standpoint. There is no doubt that the suffering of Michael J. Fox and Christopher Reeve is more emotionally compelling than an embryo in a petri dish. But if we are trying to determine the morally correct policies, then your arguments are worthless."

I can't humanely make that distinction. Politics and morality, both, should always be sensitive to the suffering of others.

If I rephrase your statement thusly,

But if a suffering patient needs a live-donor kidney, it shouldn't be denied to them.

I'm assuming you mean a kidney donation without the permission of the donor. If that's what you mean it's a false analogy. You're weighing kidney donor assault victim v. kidney patient.

Now I know you've decided that these cells in the petri dish are a person. Most people in this country haven't decided. This is not just politics. Politics is derived from morality. If we as a people ever do decide the personhood status of those cells, that status will inform our moral decisions.

The issue is (and I've tried to frame this as neutrally as possible) "theoretical person v. the suffering person in front of us."

Stephen Gordon,

What feature or characteristic is possessed by the "theorectical person" that leads you to be satisfied that it is not a person in fact?

I guess I'm thinking of the analogy of finding a person who appears to be dead and not burying the body if there is doubt the person may be alive.

Does the "theoretical person" have some person-like aspects but lacks a key component?

c_matt,

"In other words, is the mutation/difference something effected pre or post-conception?"

Pre. The idea is to perform the mutations/changes in an adult cell (like a skin cell scraped from the inside of your mouth), then put that nucleus into an egg that has had its nucleus removed. At that point you've created something akin to a human clone, except that (in theory) you know that the resulting entity cannot direct its own growth into a blastocyst, fetus, infant, etc. A loose analogy is that you've created a cancerous cell, which we grow cultures of all the time in labs with no moral qualms. But in this case the entity created may be much closer in form and capability to an embryo, which is why we have to consider the situation more carefully than the cancer cell line situation.

Stephen Gordon wrote,

Consider the posibility that I am also rational, that I love kids, that I'm against euthanasia, that I'm pro-life, and that after considering the issue, I came to a different conclusion.

I don't need to consider it - I accept it as given. I just believe you have come to the objectively wrong conclusion. The fact that you have good intentions and are a nice person doesn't change the fact that you are wrong. I could be, too, but you'll have to try and persuade me of that.

Most people in this country haven't decided. This is not just politics. Politics is derived from morality. If we as a people ever do decide the personhood status of those cells, that status will inform our moral decisions.

So a human being's personhood depends upon whether the majority recognizes it? I agree that politics is derived from morality - you seem to be saying the opposite: that the moral status depends upon how a majority of the population votes on the matter. The correct way to do it is to use moral reasoning to decide the status of the embryo, then adjust our politics and laws accordingly.

The issue is (and I've tried to frame this as neutrally as possible) "theoretical person v. the suffering person in front of us."

No, the issue is, "is an embryo a theoretical person or is it a person?"

I'll reiterate Chairm's question: what criteria do you use to determine whether someone is or is not a person? When did you become a person?

Justin,

Trimming the quote is fine - I'm a bit clueless on what the standards are for such practice, but it's your blog so you can post what you see fit. I briefly looked at it to see if there was anything I should leave out, but couldn't find anything obvious. For what it's worth, despite the length of the post I think I copied much less than half of the article.

If Ramesh is reading this, I apologize if I did something inappropriate.

Chairm:

Does the "theoretical person" have some person-like aspects but lacks a key component?

The sole person-like aspect present at the moment of conception is a complete unique genetic code. Unlike the DNA in the gametes that came together to make the fertilized egg, it is not a direct copy of either the mother or the father. It is a new unique combination. It contains the complete instructions for making a new body.

One might argue that another aspect of this special cell is that it is human life. That it is alive, and human. Well, the gametes that came together to make the fertilized egg were alive and human too. Few pro-lifers would extend protection to those cells. The blood I have drawn for a physical is alive and human. I presume nobody here has a problem with testing blood.

I think the essential difference between the gametes before conception and the fertilized egg afterward is this new unique code.

There is another thing special about this cell. It is young. My child was born just as young as I was born. This is obviously very important. If age accumulated from generation to generation life wouldn't be around for long. But it doesn't.

This youth is one of the reasons that scientists are so excited about the possibility of embryonic stem cells. Let's say the day comes when we can grow replacement tissues with embroyonic stem cells. If the doctor used therapeutic cloning he could give the patient perfectly matching tissue that is youthful. I think that's pretty cool.

If a unique DNA code is sufficient to assign personhood status to this cell, then the debate is over. We agree that one person shouldn't be sacrificed to save another.

Mike S. said:

What criteria do you use to determine whether someone is or is not a person? When did you become a person?

I don't think that this cell amounts to a person because a fertilized egg is simply genetic code plus a small amount of raw material. We are more than genetic code. My genetic programming would prefer me to spend every waking moment seducing as many pretty young women as I can - wedding vows be damned. But I don't. Why not? Because I am a person capable of making decisions independent of whatever urges biology gives me. The same cannot be said of that fertilized egg.

Something happened that made me a person sometime between now and back when a certain fertilized egg began dividing in 1969. When? I'm getting to that.

The issue is (and I've tried to frame this as neutrally as possible) "theoretical person v. the suffering person in front of us."

No, the issue is, "is an embryo a theoretical person or is it a person?"

How about: "Is this fertilized egg a person or not?"

The fact that you have good intentions and are a nice person doesn't change the fact that you are wrong. I could be, too, but you'll have to try and persuade me of that.

Fair enough. I doubt I can. Not because I think you're too stubborn to see the light. I just recognize that it is very difficult to change minds on something a fundamental as when personhood begins. Reasoning through these things in a debate is a good way to understand our own positions too. So it's not a waste even if I fail to persuade you (or vice-versa).

By the way, that phrase "to see the light," refers to a point that societies have traditionally recognized personhood - birth. Seeing that first light or taking a first breath is still required in most places before a wrong that affects a baby is considered a wrong against the baby as a person.

For example, a drunk gets in his car and plows into a minivan carrying a pregnant mother. The mother lingers in a coma until she gives birth to her child and then she dies. If the child never takes its first breath, most states will not charge the drunk with two vehicular manslaughters.

That's a pretty arbitrary thing, isn't it? Let's say one man is driving at 0.1 blood-alcohol level. He has the accident I described, but isn't too drunk to hit his brake just prior to impact. Hitting his brake meant that less force was applied to the unborn child. The child was, therefore strong enough to take that one magic breath. The drunk gets charged with two manslaughters.

A second drunk has a 0.2 blood-alcohol level. He's passed out at the wheel when he hits the pregnant mom. The baby never takes a breath and so the drunk gets charged with one manslaughter.

Which drunk is guiltier?

It's partly in recognition of this sort of absurdity that states have begun passing laws that punish people who harm unborn children "as if" they had harmed a person. I think that's a good thing. In fact if it were up to me I would protect the embryo as a person all the way back to the point of differentiation.

Differentiation is a point about two weeks after fertilization where cells begin to be assigned specific duties. I mentioned in an earlier comment about how a fertilized cell can become one person, two people, part of a person, or no person. That commitment (to become 1, 2, half, or 0 people) is made at the point of differentiation.

Differentiation obviously occurs much earlier than Rowe v. Wade's first trimester. Most women don't even know they are pregnant at this early stage. Would I deny women who don't discover their pregnancy until later the right choose? Yes I would.

Mike, you are uncomfortable with the idea that society could decide whether a fertilized egg is a person. Who else is going to decide? God may have decided, but He's keeping it to Himself. Even if everyone in our country accepted the Bible as the inerrant word of God, there is no passage that specifically deals with this question. You seem to have decided there is some objective way to know that this cell is a person. Do you have some reason to believe it?

"You seem to have decided there is some objective way to know that this cell is a person. Do you have some reason to believe it?"

You said it yourself - the fertilized egg is a unique human life. The difference between the zygote and the other cells you mentioned, like blood cells, is that it has the capacity to direct its own development towards an adult human being. The discussion on the later post from Justin about the teratomas gets at the significance of the molecular differences between a zygote, which has the capacity for self-directed development into a fetus, and a teratoma, which doesn't. But clearly simply having the same genetic code is not sufficient, since nobody thinks that somatic cells are individual people.

You use two main arguments to distinguish a zygote from a person.

Because I am a person capable of making decisions independent of whatever urges biology gives me. The same cannot be said of that fertilized egg.

The same also cannot be said of a newborn infant, or a 1 year old. It also cannot be said of a 6 month fetus, which you indicate later in your post that you would protect.

In fact if it were up to me I would protect the embryo as a person all the way back to the point of differentiation.

What is the basis for picking this point in the embryo's development? Does something magical happen to it at this point? How can its ontological status change simply because it reached a later stage of differentiation? In fact, the process of differentiation begins at the first cell division. They have done experiments with animal embryos that show that where the first cell division occurs is related to later body plan development. I claim that your choice of when to confer personhood is arbitrary, and personhood should not be conferred based upon arbitrary criteria. (You've already made the argument that the fertilized egg is indeed something different from a gamete, so I'm assuming we can agree that that particular delineation is not arbitrary.)

I've responded to Stephen's latest comment here. (This thread has slipped into the archives, anyway.)

I apologize, Mike, for not making the leap before you commented. (I've been having a rough computer night.) Please feel free to transport your comment to the new post.