Evidence of Presumption

Lane Core is correct to suggest that the New York Times isn't likely to give much space over to arguments such as that which Laurie Mylroie espouses:

Opinion polls show that most Americans still believe Iraq had substantial ties to al Qaeda and even that it was involved in 9/11. Yet among the "elite," there is tremendous opposition to this notion. A simple explanation exists for this dichotomy. The public is not personally vested in this issue, but the elite certainly are.

America's leading lights, including those in government responsible for dealing with terrorism and with Iraq, made a mammoth blunder. They failed to recognize that starting with the first assault on New York's World Trade Center, Iraq was working with Islamic militants to attack the United States. This failure left the country vulnerable on September 11, 2001. Many of those who made this professional error cannot bring themselves to acknowledge it; perhaps, they cannot even recognize it. They mock whomever presents information tying Iraq to the 9/11 attacks; discredit that information; and assert there is "no evidence." What they do not do is discuss in a rational way the significance of the information that is presented.

In this piece, Mylroie relates new information confirming the meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence in Prague. Therein, she mentions her testimony before the 9/11 Commission, which, as a ten-minute highlight of her work, is well worth a few moments of your time. Scroll down a bit, as well, for her contentious exchange with Richard Ben-Veniste. Of particular interest, considering Mylroie's thesis, is Ben-Veniste's repeated reference to the news media and stories that "occupy the front page of the newspaper on a daily basis."

It's also worth noting part of a response to Dr. Mylroie from another expert, Judith Yaphe:

Well, Dr. Mylroie's answer leaves me kind of breathless because I think she's doing exactly what troubles me the most about leaping to great conclusions, that Iraq -- that al Qaeda was a front for Iraqi intelligence. I'm sorry, I need evidence. If I'm -- if there is evidence, if we can get some material that says this, fine, but I don't see it now.

The question, among many of the questions, why would Saddam Hussein have given to a group like al Qaeda that he couldn't control, that that did pose a threat, an existential threat to him, why would he give them those weapons of mass destruction -- botulinum, chemicals, radioactive whatevers -- when he didn't want to admit he had them himself? Now, to give them to a group that fingerprints would have been easy to trace back, I would think. I don't see why he would do it. I don't think he sent them to Syria. I think he learned a great lesson in 1990 when he sent his aircraft off to Iran, never to be seen again. These are not things you share or give away, especially if you can't get them back, you can't control, and they won't do you greater danger.

This topic presents a tangle of seemingly conflicting reasoning, to be sure, but I agree with Mylroie that it's odd to choose, rather than attempt to unravel the various presumptions, to declare them insignificant. Yaphe wants proof that al Qaeda is a front for Iraqi intelligence, but she also professes incredulity that Iraq would hand off weapons to a rogue group. She notes that Hussein didn't want to admit to possessing weapons, but based on some supposed lesson learned, denies that he would export them during the approach to war.

She also steps around the most plausible reason to foster a relationship with terrorists as a delivery mechanism for WMDs, as opposed to conventional methods, which would be much more effective as a deterrent and threat: of all methods of attack, the "fingerprints" are least traceable within a shadowy organization drawing from various ideological groups around the world. My suspicion is that "front" is indeed a bit strong a term, considering the degree to which al Qaeda was a bin Laden cult of personality, but that Iraqi intelligence could very well have been intimately involved, behind a screen of false identities and intrigue, in the higher-level administration of the group, sufficiently to mitigate the risk of handing off dangerous weapons to it.

I'm not saying that I believe this, absolutely, to be the case. But for me, it would be little more than extra credit. Even Yaphe admits that the Ba'athists gave support to international terrorists, probably including training in terrorism techniques. Simply put, that is enough of a link for me — and, I should note, for a majority of Americans.