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Being Clear About Clarity
04/08/2003

I've been meaning to comment on a post by Mark at Minute Particulars for a number of days but have been, by turns, busy and exhausted. He draws an interesting allegory to capture time and moral judgement:

And now my point about future contingencies and the past, the image that the future is something that comes upon us from behind our backs with the past receding away before our eyes might be clear. When we act in a way that treats the future as known, especially with moral agents, human beings with free will, we are moving away from the "here and now" considerations of a moral act. We aren't reacting to what has been done and is now receding away before our eyes, but to what is behind us, unknown though we may hear or feel it approaching. If we make serious moral judgments about matters that have not occurred and may not occur, we are no longer working within the framework of traditional morality. And this, I think, is the shift that many are discussing.

Perhaps it's a function of my educational background, but the first reaction that comes to mind is to suggest that even "the past receding away before our eyes" isn't perfectly clear. This, I think, is the nugget of truth upon which postmodernism is built. Given personal biases, our inevitably limited access to facts, and our inherent inability to assimilate all relevant events, trends, and aspects, there is always room for doubt, always room to wonder whether an act was necessary or moral from a larger perspective. Indeed, an intelligent Catholic such as Mark — with faith in a Church incorporating a somewhat malleable Tradition, the allowance of dissent, and the promotion of vocations and sacraments bearing on varying areas of life — ought particularly to understand this. For my part, I believe the inescapably underlying doubt to be the origin of free will.

Postmodernism went too far when it threw up its arms in frustration at never being able to make incontrovertible assertions and declared that nothing is objectively knowable. I'm a bit disappointed to come to the conclusion that Mark has applied this faulty thinking in his analysis of the future. This passage, in particular, is redolent of the murky waters of postmodernist doubt and is, in fact, a marvelous summary of the process by which the ideal of thorough consideration can become corroded into an inability to ever take action:

As everyone following the debates on various conclusions from just-war theory knows, the reason people of good will and intelligence can in fact come to different conclusions is because moral decisions resist universal application. The reason is not because moral laws don't pertain to every human being, but because a moral act is an event in the "here and now" and that event is unique and can only be judged when all of the intentions and particular circumstances are accounted for. If we look at the "essence" of a moral act, the intentions of the actors and those being acted upon in the "here and now" we ought to able to demonstrate whether the act is good or bad. And this would follow from the fact that "the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing."

This is true, as far as it goes, but it does not absolve one of judgement, and it does not acknowledge that different events can have common "intentions and particular circumstances" to varying degrees, requiring further judgment of which are more broadly applicable and relevant to morality. Certainly, every moral judgement is unique, but that does not mean that the aspects that make them so bear on the morality. Consider: Do circumstances exist under which it would be moral to rape a child? And would it make a difference, in deciding action to prevent a rape of further children if a past rapist had black hair and a potential rapist is blond? If the latter question seems silly, that's intentional. Not all details must be "accounted for" to pass moral judgment. Part of developing one's moral compass is in discerning which types of information can be discarded and which can be applied relatively quickly to new situations.

This is no small consideration when the focus is turned toward the future. One needn't reverse postmodernism to understand why Mark's image of walking backwards toward the yet-to-happen is only moderately applicable. For one thing, other people pass into our view of the past before heading behind us to act in the future. Under the rubric presented by those who insist that our current war is a new introduction to American warfare, "preemption," it is emphasized that only "defensive," as opposed to "aggressive" or "offensive," war can be just. Taken to extreme lengths, however, such as those suggested by the turned back, this would preclude any actions taken in war other than, pretty literally, the deflection of bullets fired. Our side may suspect that it would prevent further attacks to wipe out an airfield, but, unless the location is completely uninhabited, such offensives would be "serious moral judgments about matters that have not occurred and may not occur."

There is a range to this analysis, of course. One can act in defense despite a lack of absolute knowledge that an attacker will, indeed, swing his sword a fourth time. On the other end, it would stretch the bounds of expectation to attack France (as gratifying as that might be) on the basis that it is working toward a "second superpower" Europe that might one day attack the United States. (Just War also covers this loophole through the "every other means" requirement.) The point is that, even when dealing with events that have not happened, judgment is possible. In my judgment, claims that the war in Iraq is unique in being a "preemptive war" are errant, if coming from those who support it, and disingenuous, coming from those who oppose.

In a post called "Far from the Madding Blogs" (scroll down from here), which impelled me finally to respond, Mark gives indication that he understands that such calls can be made. Continuing to sound distressingly like a postmodernist, Mark laments the clarity that others have displayed on the issue:

I've marveled at those who were and continue to be so confident and adamant that war with Iraq was our only option within just-war principles. I'm not now debating the issue; I'm merely marveling at the clarity some claim to have had and continue to have on such a complex issue. And I guess I've never been convinced that this apparent clarity and determination stem from a solid understanding of the Catholic Church's teaching on just-war principles, especially the teaching in some of the encyclicals of Pope John Paul II. Sure there've been learned discussions and links provided to all kinds of resources on just-war theory. But there seems to be a lack of emphasis on the further teaching that the Holy Father has contributed in a number of encyclicals during his nearly 25-year pontificate. This is troubling because, as the pope has pointed out in various places, "continuity and renewal are a proof of the perennial value of the teaching of the Church". I wonder if the "renewal" the pope offers has been missed or glossed over.

Putting aside that a "renewal" of Just War Theory in light of increased ease to power enabled by weapons of mass destruction is exactly what even those supporters who've called the war "preemptive" have suggested, I'd say there's a misapplication of onus, here. It is customary, in public discourse, for the opposing side to enunciate its best arguments. It is not sufficient to say simply, "I'm not convinced that you know what my best arguments are."

Of course, when issues of current events and life and death are involved, it is up to everybody to seek possible positions and strategies, and yet, we must admit that it would be impossible to find them all. A central purpose of discussion and debate is to bring the consolidated arguments of each side into the awareness of all sides. And in debate, and in public forums, I have not seen one relevant argument — from the Pope on down to comment box combatants — that had not be made by secular liberals already. If the Pope failed to emphasize his own, more recent, contributions to the Theory, then I'm not sure how much blame is rightly placed on such folks as myself for presuming that perhaps the renewal is in need of renewing.

As for whether our confidence ought to be cause for doubt, I confess that I fail to see the wisdom in taking such an approach. Conveniently for willful doubters, we can never know, now, what schemes of diplomacy might have finally cracked Hussein's iron grip after 25 years of the nightmare that he perpetuated. But frankly, given the way in which events and information have unfolded, I am of the opinion that people who continue to doubt would do well to doubt themselves and wonder why they have been unable to find clarity where it so obviously exists for others. This will be particularly true as we move into the stage at which we can rightly pass judgment on a war that was, even by Mark's own model of time and morality.

Posted by Justin Katz @ 10:33 PM EST